Obama Is Working With the Wrong Partners in Iraq

By overreaching, America lost the first two wars in the 21st Century. In invading Afghanistan and Iraq, President George W. Bush set as the end goal the creation of two democracies. The U.S. military heartily agreed, creating a counterinsurgency doctrine that declared, “Soldiers and Marines are nation-builders as well as warriors.” The primary purpose of military operations—boots on the ground—was not to destroy the insurgents or to train an indigenous army. Our troops were meant to protect and to persuade Iraqis and Afghans to support their new governments. The people were not the prize at war’s end; instead, they were the means of winning the war.

Retired Gen. Tony Zinni has described this as, “the (Gen. David ) Petraeus approach that aims to change the culture that breeds or gives sanctuary to extremists.” Adroit as Petraeus was, he and more than a dozen other top American commanders over a decade failed to change Islamic cultures. Afghanistan remains endemically corrupt, with the Taliban still posing a mortal threat. In Iraq, the sectarian Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Shiite political parties oppressed the Sunnis, enabling the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, or ISIS, to seize the northern part of the country.

The deterioration in both countries was exacerbated by President Barack Obama’s rush to withdraw. Then, in reaction to the publicized beheading of an American, he reversed course and declared a new policy: In the third war of the 21st Century, America would “destroy ISIS”. To do so, he authorized aerial bombing, while promising no American involvement in ground combat.

(Related: 'No Boots on the Ground' Doesn't Mean No Combat in Iraq)

In his memoir, Worthy Fights, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta wrote that Obama “vacillated” about striking Syrian forces in retaliation for their use of chemical weapons. In Panetta’s view, this “sent the wrong message to the world,” resulting in “a blow to American credibility.”

Similarly, Obama’s current war strategy is fraught with vacillation and wrong messages to the world. In Syria, the notion of destroying ISIS while leaving the Assad regime untouched is farcical. The Obama administration has no comprehensible policy regarding Syria.

In Iraq, the obvious defect is the notion that ISIS can be driven without American air controllers on the ground. A ground army cannot be defeated without eyes on targets. The classic example of a serious campaign is what happened in Afghanistan in late 2001, when small special operations forces and CIA teams controlled air strikes that smashed apart the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, while tribal warlords followed up to seize the territory.

In a parallel to Afghanistan, the Obama strategy rests upon organizing Sunni tribal warlords to throw out ISIS. However, all aid to the Sunni (and Kurdish) tribes is being funneled through—and controlled—by the Shiite government in Baghdad. This might work, if the Sunni and Kurdish tribes agree for a second time to be subject to Shiite majority rule, with no guarantee by the Obama administration that their minority rights will be observed.

The Kurds and Sunnis are right to disbelieve the Obama White House because American weapons and bombing do not and cannot change two political facts. First, based upon 10 years of steady growth, Shiite political parties and militias firmly control the government. The removal of Maliki did not alter the underlying bureaucratic apparatus. Just as the ward boss/patronage system controlled Chicago under one mayor after another, so too do the Shiite parties control the politics of Iraq. Second, Iran—not the U.S.—exerts the dominant influence over the Shiite government. Iranian aircraft continue to fly across the country en route to Damascus. Iranian soldiers are fighting on the front lines in Iraq, while Iranian generals dispense advice in Baghdad. If you don’t know who the mark is in a high-stakes game of poker, it’s probably you.

(Read More: A Chance To Drive a Wedge Between Jihadists and Sunnis)

I covered Anbar before, during and after the Sunni Awakening that was led by Sheik Sattar. I asked him why the tribes fought for three bloody years. He said, "You Americans couldn't convince us; we Sunnis had to convince ourselves.” In other words, the Sunnis had to be defeated morally as well as physically. They had to accept among themselves the end of their historical domination over the Shiites. Sattar said they were joining "the strongest tribe"—the Americans—in order to drive out al-Qaeda and regain control of their own lands.

The Sunnis viewed America as the buffer against what they called "the Persian government" in Baghdad. When President Obama pulled out all our forces—against the advice of our military and civilian officials in the Pentagon—the tribes felt betrayed. Now we are back, offering to help drive out ISIS.

But our offer is half-hearted. The Sunni tribes cannot dislodge ISIS without special operations forces teams with air controllers, and probably Ranger and Marine raids in battalion size. Obama has ruled that out. The Sunnis seek decentralized control of their lands. Obama has also ruled that out. Military aid and air support will be delivered only via the Baghdad government. But the Sunni tribes will not agree to return to a status quo ante that will again disfranchise them. Thus while trying not to antagonize us, the Sunni tribes and Kurds will concoct their own plots for self-governance.

In 1916, via the Sykes-Picot agreement, England and France divided up Mesopotamia. Now in disarray, those artificial borders are unlikely to be reconstituted. The administration must offer the Kurds and Sunnis the status of confederation, with oil and natural gas revenues controlled by a UN body, not by Baghdad.

In sum, Obama has initiated the third major war of the 21st Century, while applying political and military covenants that make his goal—the destruction of ISIS—impossible to achieve. He has bequeathed to his successor a geopolitical and wartime mess.