How the Lessons of Iraq Are Shaping the Fight Against the Islamic State

As the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria continues to dominate the headlines, many commentators have called on U.S. policymakers to remember the lessons produced by over a decade of hard fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. One of the key lessons from those conflicts is the importance of patience and restraint when responding to enemy aggression. A  premature or imprecise application of U.S. military power in response to recent ISIS actions could undermine our larger efforts to defeat this threat and the larger threat of violent extremism in the region. We learned the importance of patience and restraint at the tactical level in Iraq; these lessons are applicable now at the strategic level against ISIS. Our enemies are dangerous and determined; we cannot afford to give them ammunition that would strengthen their narrative.

When I took a battalion of Marines to Iraq in 2007, the U.S. military had come a long way in its understanding of the value of patience and restraint. We had learned the hard way that we could cause collateral damage and inflict casualties upon the local population if we were too quick or imprecise in how we applied force. The imprecise application of American firepower could create more insurgents, drive a wedge between U.S. forces and the Iraqi people, and provide evidence to support the enemy’s narrative that U.S. troops were foreign invaders.

Iraqi insurgents understood this. One of their standard tactics involved hiding among civilians and baiting us into fights that would inevitably lead to civilian casualties. We quickly learned that if we rushed to use force on the enemy’s terms without understanding the larger situation, we could cause civilian casualties and undermine our overall efforts to defeat the insurgency.

Our military had absorbed these lessons by the time I was preparing to deploy in 2007. My staff and I went to great lengths to teach it to our Marines before we arrived in theater. Our Marines understood the necessity of clearly identifying targets before taking offensive action and the requirement to apply force in a way that minimized the chances of harming the innocent people of Al Anbar when taking the fight to the enemy. Tactical patience and restraint were fundamental tenets that drove how we trained and how we fought. Once in Iraq, we found that our efforts paid off.

Much of the success of U.S. forces in Al Anbar province came from our ability to fight the insurgency with great tenacity and skill while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage. We deprived the enemy of a key propaganda message and made it more difficult for them to generate local support for their operations.

It is vital that the same lessons of patience and restraint are remembered today at the strategic level as we consider future actions against ISIS. The Islamic State’s leaders are working now to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against foreign invaders. As we learned in Iraq, a rush to action in response to enemy provocation can create unwanted consequences and our well-intentioned actions can actually play into the hands of our enemies, giving them a victory larger than our immediate tactical success

The fight against ISIS is part of a larger war against violent extremist ideologies.  We need to remember this as we move forward in Iraq. It is becoming increasingly clear that we will take the fight ISIS. U.S. combat power can play a critical role against ISIS. In order to be effective, this combat power will have to be applied in a patient and deliberate manner—it cannot be done in a way that is driven by the emotion of the moment. The application of U.S. combat power will also require detailed intelligence to ensure the actions we take are directed against the right targets. We must have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground and a comprehensive plan before we pull the trigger.

Colonel Stephen Liszewski, U.S. Marine Corps, is a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Before coming to CFR, he served as Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment.  His combat deployments have included Iraq in 2007  and Afghanistan in 2012. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government.

This post appears courtesy of CFR.org.