What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’

The purported sinking of a Chinese nuclear submarine at a Wuhan shipyard pier is the latest example of Western reporting on military developments in China that overlooks important details and context, or even takes the wrong lessons from the fragments of stories they tell.

The incident, which took place in June, drew some mention the following month on social media and even in the defense press, but it went viral after a Sept. 26 report in the Wall Street Journal touched off coverage from Fox News to CBS. What apparently lit up the U.S. media landscape were the assertions, attributed to unnamed U.S. defense officials, that the submarine was nuclear-powered. Many of the subsequent reports suggested that the incident revealed safety concerns about a new class of PLA Navy nuclear submarine and a serious setback for China’s military modernization.

These are mischaracterizations. Moreover, the reporting actually buried the lead. The shipyard accident tells us very little about the future of PLA naval modernization, but the submarine itself does.

The afflicted boat was said to be a “Type 041 Zhou-class submarine” powered by a nuclear reactor. But tracing that claim to its origins reveals the importance of context and of using varied sources. The designation seems to have first publicly appeared in Chinese media sources in late 2023, which identified the “Type 041” as an improved variant of the Type 039C Yuan-class submarine. Two of the submarines were said to be in production at the Wuhan shipyard with advanced air-independent propulsion engines, not nuclear reactors.

In spring 2024, rumors began to emerge on the Chinese internet that China was developing a nuclear reactor for a 4,000-ton submarine the size of the Type 039/041. Most of the world’s nuclear-powered submarines are significantly larger. The rumors took off when Du Wenlong, a PLA senior colonel-turned-state-television commentator, appeared to drop veiled hints. “Some people say that China is making a ‘Type 041’ small nuclear submarine,” Du wrote, going on to argue that the PLA should indeed invest in such technology. 

Rumors continued to percolate over the summer, even as some Chinese military forums pointed out that China’s only known nuclear-capable shipyard is in Huludao, on the northern Bohai Gulf, and that there were no indications that the Wuhan shipyard had received certifications to produce nuclear submarines. While it is possible that the Wuhan shipyard built this “Type 041” submarine only to have its nuclear power plant or fuel installed elsewhere, reactors and fuel rods are not something one just drops into a pressure hull. Installing a nuclear reactor post-assembly would be inefficient and unlikely. Moreover, China’s limited experience in building nuclear submarines suggests that it would more likely evolve its designs from conventional to nuclear rather than launch a revolutionary, keel-up nuclear design in Wuhan.

Further context comes from a PLA officer who had recently written that China’s navy will focus on building more nuclear-powered submarines. The expansion of the Huludao nuclear shipyard over the past several years supports that claim. However, given its relative dearth of nuclear submarine design experience and engineering talent, it would be difficult for China to increase nuclear-submarine production at two shipyards simultaneously. 

The point is that a preponderance of public sourcing indicates there is far more uncertainty about the ship itself than the headlines would have it. Indeed, there is nothing in the available reporting that indicates an actual nuclear incident. The satellite photos showed four crane barges that may have been deployed to raise a sunken object, but no nuclear-response efforts were detected. This was not Chernobyl.

What was missed 

Even worse, the media reports focusing on the potential nuclear nature of the shipyard accident missed what this submarine actually does tell us about PLA naval modernization. Today’s Chinese subs lack a vertical launch system, or VLS, limiting their ability to carry and quickly fire land-attack and anti-ship missiles. The ill-fated submarine, by contrast, had an extended hull with a section that appears to contain a VLS. Chinese language sources indicate it would accommodate long-range YJ-18 anti-ship missiles or CJ-10 land-attack missiles. Nuclear-powered or not, the prospect of numerous, difficult-to-locate submarines that can deliver a vastly larger salvo of weapons against ships or air bases would boost Chinese capability and complicate allied defense plans.

This story highlights the risk of both dropping into a topic and relying too much on unnamed U.S. military officials, who bring biases along with perspectives and information. In this case, the source appears to have been happy to highlight a Chinese submarine accident and what the incident may say about PLA capability. Yet U.S. defense officials—and the subsequent media reports—have said relatively little about the PLA’s announcement that it successfully test-launched an ICBM deep into the Pacific Ocean, the very same week of the reporting about this shipyard incident that happened months ago.

This story also underlines a larger problem in Western media reporting on China’s military in recent years: too often, it swings between two extremes that portray the PLA as either comically inept or ten feet tall.

The ICBM test reminds us of a similar media frenzy sparked by a dubious claim earlier this year. In January, Western media aired claims by unnamed U.S. officials that corrupt PLA officers had filled their missiles with water. The reporting seemed to be unaware that the Chinese term 灌水 (guànshuǐ), which does mean “to pour water into” but also references unscrupulous butchers adding water to meat to increase its weight and price, used metaphorically to refer to corruption. Yes, the PLA Rocket Force has experienced a crisis of corruption. No, they do not fill their missiles with water to cover up that corruption.

Media coverage of nuclear issues in particular often suffers from mischaracterization and hyperbole. In July, the North American Aerospace Defense Command issued a statement about a flight of Russian Tu-95s and PLA H-6 bombers near Alaska; they were not, NORAD took pains to point out, seen as a threat. Several media reports, however, heralded Chinese “nuclear-capable bombers” patrolling near the United States. A quick reference check of the H-6 tail numbers clearly visible in the NORAD photos indicates these were H-6K variants, part of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command 10th Air Division, 28th Air Regiment. These aircraft were not the PLA’s nuclear-capable H-6Ns. Again, yes, China has nuclear-capable bombers and is building up that capability; no, they did not fly into a U.S. air defense identification zone. 

The issues in U.S.-China security are of growing domestic interest and political importance, especially during an election season. As such, it is ever more vital that mass media reporting on PLA capabilities avoids the temptation to hunt for “clicks” and “eyeballs” and instead seeks out the details and context necessary to fully understand the implications of China’s military modernization.

J. Michael Dahm is a Senior Associate with BluePath Labs, a Senior Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, and a Lecturer in International Affairs at the George Washington University.

P.W. Singer is a best-selling author of such books on war and technology as Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, and Burn-In; senior fellow at New America; and co-founder of Useful Fiction, a strategic narratives company.